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The UK’s Sovereignty Situation: Brexit,
Bewilderment and Beyond…
Michael Gordon*
Debate about ‘sovereignty’ has become impossible to avoid in the UK’s current, post-
referendum but pre-Brexit, constitutional environment. Perhaps this is nothing new,
and UK constitutionalism has always been shaped, quite explicitly and to a signiﬁcant
extent, by a captivation with the concept of sovereignty. Yet at the very least, the 2016
UK referendum on European Union (EU) membership has served as the centrepiece
around which public and elite exchanges about legal and political dimensions of
sovereignty have visibly intensiﬁed. In this context, this paper aims to reﬂect
brieﬂy and critically on the UK’s present sovereignty situation, considering the use
(and abuse) of the concept in debate about national membership of the EU, its
relevance (and irrelevance) to the process through which we move to exit from
the Union, and also the potential implications of Brexit for our often confused
national understanding(s) of this idea.
I. SOVEREIGNTY BEFORE, DURING AND AFTER THE EU REFERENDUM
A range of concerns about sovereignty have been exhibited by various actors in the UK
before, during and after the 2016 referendum. The recurrence of this theme provides a
clear indication that the (attempted) reconciliation of national ideas of sovereignty with
membership of the EU has been a source of enduring angst in parts of the UK’s political
establishment (and indeed, perhaps the referendum result suggests, in a substantial
section of the electorate). In the years before the referendum, under the previous Con-
servative–Liberal Democrat coalition government, we saw the enactment of the Euro-
pean Union Act 2011. The 2011 Act sought not only to establish a series of direct
democratic ‘locks’ on the transfer of further power or competence from the UK to
the EU, but also to reafﬁrm in statute that the sovereignty of the UK Parliament was
retained during membership of the Union.1 That what was advertised by the govern-
ment as a ‘sovereignty clause’ curiously failed to include the word ‘sovereignty’ at
all does not diminish the signiﬁcance of this as an exercise in legislative
* Liverpool Law School, University of Liverpool. All websites accessed 5 November 2016.
1 See Paul Craig, ‘The European Union Act 2011: Locks, Limits and Legality’ (2011) 48 Common Market
Law Review 1915; Michael Gordon and Michael Dougan, ‘The United Kingdom’s European Union Act
2011: “Who Won the Bloody War Anyway?”’ (2012) 37 European Law Review 3.
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experimentation—if anything, it further emphasises the ethereal quality, and perhaps
therefore the related allure, of a constitutional concept resistant to being captured in law.
In the more immediate period prior to the referendum, sovereignty featured promi-
nently in the (then) Prime Minister David Cameron’s attempts to renegotiate the UK’s
position within the EU. Sovereignty concerns ﬁlled one of the four negotiating ‘baskets’,2
and the ﬁnal deal—rejected by the electorate and generally overlooked during the refer-
endum campaign itself—included concessions for the UK. National parliaments, acting
in sufﬁcient numbers, would have been given ‘red card’ powers to veto EU legislative
proposals, and—perhaps less substantially, yet symbolically more signiﬁcant—the EU
Treaties would be amended to provide the UK with a clear exemption from provisions
charting ‘ever closer union’ between the Member States.3
During the referendum campaign there was yet further engagement with the idea of
sovereignty. Afforded ﬂeeting attention was Cameron’s proposed (or at least, announced)
‘sovereignty bill’,4 which might presumably have offered some upgrade on a 2011 edition
‘sovereignty clause’. Yet the details of this sovereignty bill never emerged—beyond the
counterintuitive suggestion that it would have included provisions to enhance the position
of the domestic judiciary through the creation of a ‘constitutional court’5—and this now
seemingly lies (along with much else) on the political scrapheap. The idea of sovereignty
was not only deployed in these suggestions of the remain-campaigning government that
we could take further domestic steps towards its better preservation while retaining EU
membership. On the leave side, we saw something tantamount to sovereignty hysteria,
reﬂected in that campaign’s catch-all rhetoric of ‘TakeBackControl’, and,most ludicrously,
in declarations that exiting the EU would amount to an ‘Independence Day’ for the UK.6
Finally, after the referendum, and the vote to depart from the EU, ideas of sover-
eignty are crucially shaping debates about how we Brexit. We see questions concerning
the authority of the ‘advisory’ referendum result and the possibility of the decision being
reversed by the sovereign UK Parliament.7 We see questions concerning the role of the
2 See ‘PM’s Letter to President of the European Council Donald Tusk’ (10 November 2015) <www.gov.uk/
government/publications/eu-reform-pms-letter-to-president-of-the-european-council-donald-tusk>.
3 See ‘Draft Decision of the Heads of State or Government, meeting within the European Council, concern-
ing a new settlement for the United Kingdom within the European Union’, EUCO 4/16 (2 November
2016) <www.consilium.europa.eu/en/european-council/president/pdf/new-settlement/>.
4 See ‘EU Deal: Cameron Vows to Put Commons Sovereignty “Beyond Doubt”’ The Guardian (3 February
2016) <www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/feb/03/eu-deal-david-cameron-uk-parliament-sovereignty-
beyond-doubt-boris-johnson>.
5 See Jeff King, ‘On the Proposal for a UK Constitutional Court’ (UK Constitutional Law Blog, 8 February
2016) <https://ukconstitutionallaw.org/2016/02/08/jeff-king-on-the-proposal-for-a-uk-constitutional-
court/>; Mike Gordon, ‘The UK’s Sovereignty Uncertainty’ (UK Constitutional Law Blog, 11 February
2016) <https://ukconstitutionallaw.org/2016/02/11/mike-gordon-the-uks-sovereignty-uncertainty/>.
6 See eg, ‘EU Referendum: Boris Johnson Says Thursday Could Become Britain’s “Independence Day”’ The
Independent (21 June 2016) <www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/eu-referendum-boris-johnson-
independence-day-live-debate-bbc-vote-leave-brexit-remain-a7094531.html>.
7 See eg, Geoffrey Robertson, ‘How to Stop Brexit: Get Your MP to Vote It Down’ The Guardian (27 June
2016) <www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016/jun/27/stop-brexit-mp-vote-referendum-members-
parliament-act-europe>.
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devolved institutions in the negotiation of withdrawal, and whether individual constitu-
ent nations—especially the remain-voting Scotland or Northern Ireland—could ‘veto’
the UK-wide decision.8 And we see questions concerning the constitutional position
and powers of the UK Parliament in the process of exiting the EU. In this particular
context, the concept of sovereignty is perhaps most controversially ﬁguring in arguments
as to the domestic authority for giving notiﬁcation of a national decision to leave the EU,
which, in accordance with Article 50 of the Treaty on European Union, initiates a
process of negotiation at the European level leading to UK exit.9
All of this gives cause for reﬂection, in the ongoing aftermath of the referendum,
on the UK’s present sovereignty situation. There is much confusion about how exactly
sovereignty is (or should have been) applicable in these various debates. In no small
part this is due to the conﬂation of different understandings of sovereignty. Of par-
ticular importance has been a failure to appreciate the distinction between internal
and external ideas of sovereignty: the domestic concept of parliamentary sovereignty
as a fundamental principle of UK constitutional law, and the national sovereignty of
the UK as a state engaged in supranational and international systems and
relationships.10
Why have we seen these very different understandings of sovereignty collapse into
a single murky soup? It is not clear whether we have witnessed wilful elision for dupli-
citous ends, with those hostile to the European project exploiting a constitutional
familiarity with parliamentary sovereignty to make interferences with state sovereignty
seem more grievous. Or whether this referendum experience merely betrays a lack of
understanding of core—and, of course, in some respects ﬂuid—constitutional con-
cepts. Either way (or some other way besides), it is important to try to trace some
of the implications of this confused thinking, both because ideas of sovereignty will
be of continuing signiﬁcance as we negotiate our way through Brexit, and also to
start to appraise our potential situation in the aftermath of exiting the EU, and
beyond. In the next section, therefore, the paper will consider the concept of parlia-
mentary sovereignty and its relevance to Brexit, before moving on to explore the idea
of national sovereignty and its relevance to Brexit. In doing so, and pushing past some
of the bewilderment, we may ﬁnd that any expectation that Brexit could herald a glor-
ious restoration of sovereignty in the UK emerges as a false promise based on a ﬂawed
premise.
8 See eg, ‘Theresa May: No Scotland Opt-out or Veto from Brexit’ The Telegraph (2 October 2016) <www.
telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/10/02/theresa-may-no-scotland-opt-out-or-veto-from-brexit/>.
9 See eg, ‘Theresa May Does Not Intend to Trigger Article 50 This Year, Court Told’ The Guardian (19 July
2016) <www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/jul/19/government-awaits-ﬁrst-legal-opposition-to-brexit-
in-high-court>.
10 This is not to suggest that other conceptions of sovereignty are not available, or that other clashes between
competing understandings of sovereignty have not been generated by the referendum result: see eg,
Vernon Bogdanor, ‘Europe and the Sovereignty of the People’ (2016) 87 The Political Quarterly 348.
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II. PARLIAMENTARY SOVEREIGNTY AND BREXIT
The UK’s membership of the EU—and the commitments such membership entails—
features very prominently in the modern constitutional narrative that parliamentary
sovereignty is a much challenged doctrine.11 Yet while undoubtedly presenting difﬁcult
questions, the fundamental conundrum on which this challenge was founded is ulti-
mately one which has been solved: the domestic doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty
can be reconciled with the idea that EU law is to have domestic supremacy.12 There
remains considerable debate as to exactly how this reconciliation has been achieved,
and its broader constitutional consequences. Yet what is truly crucial is recognising
that EU membership (among other things) has prompted us to recalibrate our under-
standing of the meaning and implications of parliamentary sovereignty, rather than
abandon as unsalvageable the idea of a constitution founded on legally unlimited law-
making power.13
Yet this academic resolution—such as it is—has never seemed to translate into
public discourse. In the public realm, or at least parts of it, there is still a sense that par-
liamentary sovereignty is left precarious by EU membership in particular.14 No doubt
attempts by successive governments to encourage the UK Parliament to legislate to
(re)conﬁrm its legislative sovereignty might have contributed to or endorsed the appar-
ent sense that this power was in peril. The most recent proposal of this kind, discussed
above, teetered on collapsing into total incoherence, founded as it was on the notion of
empowering a constitutional court in the name of preserving parliamentary sovereignty.
Such failings in understanding suggest that we should be grateful the government never
developed a plan which would have changed the constitution while purporting to pre-
serve it, but also the extent to which ‘innovative’ proposals have been thought necessary
to somehow save sovereignty.
If precise thinking about parliamentary sovereignty was not, therefore, a feature of
the referendum or its run up, we might wonder whether this can be rectiﬁed as we move
through the process of exiting the EU. Yet we are also beginning to see problematic
engagement with the doctrine in a number of the responses to the Brexit vote.
First, the idea that it might be possible for the ‘advisory’ referendum result to be
reversed stems from a failure to understand the idea of parliamentary sovereignty in
11 See, eg, HWR Wade, ‘What Has Happened to the Sovereignty of Parliament?’ (1991) 107 Law Quarterly
Review 1.
12 See Lord Bridge in R v Secretary of State for Transport, ex p Factortame (No 2) [1991] 1 AC 603 (HL)
658–59. More recently, see Lord Mance in Pham v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2015]
UKSC 19; [2015] 1 WLR 1591 [80].
13 For the argument that a ‘manner and form’ understanding of parliamentary sovereignty should now be
understood to represent the constitutional orthodoxy in the UK, see Michael Gordon, Parliamentary
Sovereignty in the UK Constitution: Process, Politics and Democracy (Hart 2015).
14 See, eg, anxiety about the proposed ‘red card’ procedure in the House of Commons European Scrutiny
Committee, UK Government’s Renegotiation of EU Membership: Parliamentary Sovereignty and Scrutiny
(2015–16, HC 458, 15 December 2015) para 132.
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its constitutional context. Parliament certainly retains the legal power to legislate in a
way which is contrary to the decision reached by a majority of the electorate in the
2016 referendum. But that Parliament is legally unconstrained in this regard is only
part of the picture—this power exists and is exercised in a constitutional environment
in which that legislative authority is limited by a range of crucial political, democratic,
moral and practical considerations. Indeed, the entire justiﬁcation for the doctrine of
parliamentary sovereignty, and the legally unlimited legislative power which it allocates
to the UK Parliament, is premised on the fact that this power is constitutionally limited,
just not by law. And as the political responses to the Brexit vote surely demonstrate—
with a new Prime Minister aligned with the remain side insisting that EU exit must
nevertheless be delivered15—these non-legal constitutional limits are often far more
profound in their force and effects. The referendum may be legally advisory, but it is
no rejection of parliamentary sovereignty to recognise that its result is constitutionally
binding.
Secondly, with Scotland and Northern Ireland voting to remain, and England and
Wales voting to leave, we have seen some suggestions that the constituent nations of
the UK may be entitled to a veto over Brexit. Yet, again, while the existence of this div-
ision in mandates raises acutely difﬁcult democratic questions, the entire devolution
scheme preserves in general the UK Parliament’s sovereign power to legislative on any
subject,16 and relations with the EU in particular are matters reserved to the UK,17 or
in the case of Wales, not transferred.18 From this starting point, rather than seek to
assert the existence of a veto power, other avenues of constitutional engagement exist
for the devolved governments and institutions; in particular, in exploiting their positions
to obtain inﬂuence in the negotiation of Brexit (with the UK government, at least at the
outset, recognising in principle the need for ‘national consensus’ on the shape of
Brexit).19 There is also the nuclear alternative of referendums on independence from
the post-EU UK, for which standing authority exists in Northern Ireland,20 and, on
the 2013 precedent, temporary authority could surely be procured in Scotland.21 The
devolution scheme, approached in this way, at a minimum creates the potential for
greater inﬂuence and further options for the remain-voting nations (and perhaps
even the leave-voting Wales) in relation to Brexit than exist for remain-voting parts
of England.
15 See ‘Theresa May Says “Brexit Means Brexit” and There Will Be No Attempt to Remain Inside EU’ The
Independent (11 July 2016) <www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/theresa-may-brexit-means-brexit-
conservative-leadership-no-attempt-remain-inside-eu-leave-europe-a7130596.html>.
16 Scotland Act 1998, s 29(2)(d); Northern Ireland Act 1998, s 6(2)(d); Government of Wales Act 2006, s 108
(6)(c).
17 Scotland Act 1998, Sch 5, para 7(1); Northern Ireland Act 1998, Sch 2, para 3.
18 Government of Wales Act 2006, Sch 7.
19 Statement by the Secretary of State for Exiting the EU, David Davis MP, Hansard, HC Deb 5 September
2016, vol 614, cols 38–41.
20 Northern Ireland Act 1998, s 1.
21 Scotland Act 1998 (Modiﬁcation of Schedule 5) Order 2013, SI 2013/242.
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Thirdly—and perhaps most controversially—the notion of parliamentary sover-
eignty is likely to be deployed in the (at time of writing imminent) legal challenge con-
cerning the domestic authority for making, and notifying to the European Council, a
national decision to depart from the EU, in accordance with the terms of Article 50
of the Treaty on European Union. The idea that this challenge is to preserve parliamen-
tary sovereignty has already been aired for rhetorical purposes in the prior publicity
campaign conducted by the applicants, and, as such, can be expected to feature as a com-
ponent of the wide-ranging legal arguments being developed.22 Yet this dispute is not
really about parliamentary sovereignty at all. Or, at least, it is no more about parliamen-
tary sovereignty than any other case which involves the interpretation of statute, and
therefore the analysis of Parliament’s legislative intent. Parliament has, inevitably in
light of its constitutional position, been heavily involved in the path that has led to
Brexit: most signiﬁcantly, by enacting the European Union Referendum Act 2015,
which authorised a referendum on EU membership. Parliamentary sovereignty is not
a constitutional principle which requires the UK Parliament to take all decisions;
instead it gives Parliament the ultimate (and unlimited) responsibility for establishing
the framework within which decisions are taken, which it has done in the 2015 Act.
That Parliament has passed power to the electorate to decide whether to remain
within or leave the EU does not diminish its sovereignty;23 indeed, to facilitate a national
referendum is a potent exercise of its sovereign legislative power.
Instead, the Article 50 challenge is fundamentally about the royal prerogative, and
the government’s power to conduct foreign affairs and international relations. Inevitably
there is constitutional interaction between the prerogative power exercised by the gov-
ernment at the international (and therefore also the European) level, and the domestic
legislative power of Parliament: for agreements reached at the international level to have
domestic force, they must be given effect in statute. In this case, the implementing legis-
lation related to membership of the EU—the European Communities Act 1972—can
only be repealed by Parliament. But this fact alone does not constrain the government
acting at the international level from altering (or in this case, removing) the obligations
associated with EU membership.24 There is nothing in the terms of the 1972 Act which
prevents a decision to withdraw, and indeed, the Article 50 withdrawal process itself has
been endorsed by Parliament, through enacting the European Union (Amendment) Act
2008, giving domestic legal effect to the changes to EU law introduced by the Treaty of
Lisbon, of which the creation of Article 50 was one. Parliament could unquestionably
have used its sovereign power to restrict the use of the prerogative in relation to an
Article 50 decision, but it has not done so: not in the 2015 Act, which is silent on
22 See eg, ‘Article 50 Process on Brexit Faces Legal Challenge to Ensure Parliamentary Involvement’ (Mishcon
de Reya website, 3 July 2016) <www.mishcon.com/news/ﬁrm_news/article_50_process_on_brexit_faces_
legal_challenge_to_ensure_parliamentary_involvement_07_2016>.
23 Contrary to the argument in Bogdanor (n 10).
24 See the conclusion of the Divisional Court on this point in R v Secretary of State for Foreign and Common-
wealth Affairs, ex p Lord Rees-Mogg [1994] QB 552, 567.
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next steps, nor in the European Union Act 2011, which constrains the government in
relation to almost every other kind of signiﬁcant decision imaginable at EU level.25
This is not unlawful use of the prerogative to, in effect, nullify an Act of the sovereign
Parliament. Triggering Article 50, and commencing the (potentially extendable) two-
year negotiation period, starts a process during which EU law still applies in the UK
by virtue of the 1972 Act itself. Rather than focusing on triggering Article 50 as an iso-
lated moment, as this legal challenge demands, we should view the constitutional process
holistically. During this process of withdrawal, Parliament has responsibility for repeal-
ing the 1972 Act, responding to the government’s actions at the European level, just as
Parliament did when initially enacting the 1972 Act. And, of course, the government’s
actions at the international level are themselves a consequence of Parliament’s action
at the domestic level, because they are a response to the decision of the electorate at
the referendum authorised by parliamentary legislation. Parliament started the
process of withdrawal at the domestic level with the 2015 Act, and will conclude it at
the domestic level by replacing the 1972 Act.26 It is absolutely right—indeed, vital—
that Parliament should debate and scrutinise the government’s plans for the withdrawal
negotiations, but such activity at international level does not need further legal author-
isation by the UK legislature, and this is no violation of the doctrine of parliamentary
sovereignty, when properly understood in constitutional context.
There is a degree of irony in some appeals for the judicial ‘enforcement’ of parlia-
mentary sovereignty, now that this has become a convenient concept, when much
energy has been directed towards diminishing this doctrine in the courts in recent
years.27 We must therefore avoid constructing a legal narrative which exploits parlia-
mentary sovereignty as a rhetorical ﬂourish, while implicitly inviting Parliament to
use its legislative power to reverse a clear, direct democratic decision, even where we
may disagree strongly with the outcome. This is especially important because manufac-
turing a clash between direct and representative democracy may well mean empowering
the entirely unrepresentative upper chamber of Parliament. If claims about parliamentary
sovereignty are used to encourage the judiciary to mandate that new legislation is
required to approve UK exit from the EU, and a bill is subsequently blocked by the
House of Lords, then we may end up not only in a constitutional crisis, but in a legiti-
macy black hole.
If the immediate aftermath of Brexit can be navigated successfully, will the termin-
ation of the UK’s membership of the EU see domestic debate about the salience of par-
liamentary sovereignty subside? From one perspective, argument about sovereignty and
its implications is such an embedded feature of the contemporary constitution, it seems
difﬁcult to imagine that withdrawal of one speciﬁc stimulus—no matter how
25 See n 1.
26 See the announcement of a ‘Great Repeal Bill’ by the PM: ‘Repealing EU Act Will “Make UK Independent”
Says Theresa May’ (BBC website, 2 October 2016) <www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-37533217>.
27 See, eg, R (Jackson) v Attorney General [2005] UKHL 56, [2006] 1 AC 262 [102], [104], [159]; Moohan v
The Lord Advocate [2014] UKSC 67, [2015] AC 901 [35].
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fundamental—will radically shift the terms of debate. While much is at this stage
unclear, the possibility that Brexit might prompt broader change to the architecture
of the territorial constitution means the topic of the UK Parliament’s legislative
power, as it relates to the devolved institutions in Scotland and Northern Ireland in par-
ticular, will surely remain of great signiﬁcance.
Yet, from another perspective, wrestling with the commitments ﬂowing from EU
membership has been a key driver of judicial efforts to construct a common law consti-
tution.28 Will exiting the EU have a chilling effect on attempts to discover the consti-
tutional statutes, instruments and principles which might have the potential to
ground a framework of higher order domestic law? Such a common law framework,
if ever established, could have signiﬁcant potential implications for the idea of parlia-
mentary sovereignty, in so far as it would provide the gloss to conceal an otherwise
blatant judicial power-grab. Yet perhaps instead such efforts—if they are to be
pursued—will now need to be refocused, becoming part of broader moves to articulate
a legal framework within which the power of Parliament must be exercised, and is there-
fore potentially constrained. We might see such an approach at work, for example, in
Lord Neuberger’s leading judgment in Evans,29 in which ‘the principle of legality’ was
expanded to the point where it was no longer a tool of statutory interpretation in cir-
cumstances of ambiguity, but sufﬁcient to render the clear language of a statute
utterly insigniﬁcant. Or in Nicklinson,30 where many of the judges were not uncomfor-
table with the idea of using a declaration of incompatibility under section 4 of the
Human Rights Act 1998—or even the mere threat of its use—to ‘encourage’ Parliament
to reconsider certain highly contentious and contested policy decisions. The modern
self-conﬁdence developed by the judiciary, initially as a consequence of the expanded
powers accruing to them by virtue of the UK’s position in the EU, seems unlikely to
be inhibited solely by the termination of that membership. Instead, debate about parlia-
mentary sovereignty can be expected to continue, both during Brexit, and beyond.
III. NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY AND BREXIT
If the idea that exiting the EU was somehow necessary to preserve parliamentary sover-
eignty emerges as based on a ﬂawed understanding of this fundamental constitutional
doctrine, claims about the dilution of national sovereignty may nevertheless have
greater relevance to Brexit. For the pooling of the latter kind of sovereignty to enable
cooperation among states at the supranational level was always at the heart of the
28 See, eg, Thoburn v Sunderland City Council [2002] EWHC 195, [2003] QB 151; R (HS2 Action Alliance Ltd)
v Secretary of State for Transport [2014] UKSC 3, [2014] 1 WLR 324; Pham (n 12).
29 R (Evans) v Attorney General [2015] UKSC 21, [2015] AC 1787. For critical discussion, see Michael
Gordon, ‘The UK’s Fundamental Constitutional Principle: Why the UK Parliament Is Still Sovereign
and Why It Still Matters’ (2015) 26 King’s Law Journal 229, 237–42.
30 R (Nicklinson) v Ministry of Justice [2014] UKSC 38, [2015] AC 657.
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European project,31 and in light of this centrality, debate about the appropriate balance
between national and EU power and competence will no doubt persist long after the exit
of the UK. Yet while national and parliamentary sovereignty must be understood as dis-
tinct phenomena, it is worth considering whether the tendency to collapse the two has a
distinctly British ﬂavour. Has domestic preoccupation with parliamentary sovereignty
created an environment in the UK in which general claims of reduced national sover-
eignty are felt more acutely, and can therefore prosper? The centrality of parliamentary
sovereignty as a constitutional organising principle and symbolic focal point in the UK,
in the absence of a formal constitutional text or instrument, makes it readily available as
a key touchstone of domestic political debate, even if one which is subject to challenge
from a range of different perspectives.32 Do our constitutional arrangements invite the
kind of confusion about sovereignty that has characterised the path to Brexit?
These are difﬁcult questions for those who defend the doctrine of parliamentary
sovereignty as a normatively attractive constitutional doctrine, and, unsurprisingly,
there are no easy answers. Euroscepticism, in the UK and elsewhere, is obviously a multi-
faceted phenomenon driven by many and complex forces, and not simply a function of
vague claims about sovereignty. Moreover, it is tempting to suggest that increased fam-
iliarity with ideas of sovereignty should be a source of better understanding, rather than
bewilderment. Yet while there is clearly much to be desired in this respect, support for
the kind of democratic constitutionalism with which parliamentary sovereignty is most
closely associated cannot be contingent on its ability to deliver only political outcomes of
which we approve.33 Instead, a choice of constitutional system will depend on a combi-
nation of reasons, both principled and practical in nature, and while there is much scope
to reform the UK’s contemporary political constitution, the only response to Brexit must
be to engage openly with, and not seek to suppress, the politics which have led to this
point.
In so doing, we can recognise that there are legitimate concerns about the demo-
cratic character of EU governance,34 and the activity and positioning of the Court of
Justice of the European Union,35 among other things. But such speciﬁc challenges for
Member States acting both within and against the EU institutions are ultimately also
underpinned by difﬁcult questions about how national sovereignty can most effectively
be utilised. It is far from radical to suggest that power and inﬂuence are gained by the
acceptance of contingent constraints on sovereignty—indeed, this insight has long
31 See Case 6/64 Costa v ENEL [1964] ECR 585, [1964] CMLR 425.
32 See Gordon (n 13), chapter 1.
33 See KD Ewing, ‘The Resilience of the Political Constitution’ (2013) 14 German Law Journal 2111, 2117–18;
Gordon (n 13), 293–322.
34 On problems even in EU implementation of democratic mechanisms designed to offset its ‘democratic
deﬁcit’, see, eg, James Organ, ‘Decommissioning Direct Democracy? A Critical Analysis of Commission
Decision-making on the Legal Admissibility of European Citizens Initiative Proposals’ (2014) 10 European
Constitutional Law Review 422.
35 See, among others, the concerns about the approach of the Court of Justice of the European Union
articulated by UK courts in HS2 (n 28), and Pham (n 12).
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been a fundamental of sovereignty theory.36 And this is to say nothing of what is now the
necessity of cooperation between states in an increasingly integrated global world, and
the overlapping national, supranational and international legal norms that are generated
by the interaction of these different political systems.37
Against this backdrop, it is far from apparent that big questions about national
sovereignty and the (democratic) accountability of power in supra- or international
structures are any better confronted, let alone resolved,38 by attempted constitutional
isolationism in nation states. This does not mean these questions and challenges are
not real and pressing; rather that they will be present for nation states, whether
members of the EU or otherwise. Yet even those questions which are speciﬁc to the
EU and its advanced constitutional architecture may, paradoxically, be more challenging
on the outside of a European project which, in Cameron’s renegotiation exercise,
showed a clear willingness to respond to UK concerns on sovereignty and otherwise.
Whether Brexit is hard, soft or occupies some ﬁrm middle ground, future UK engage-
ment with the EU is inevitable, and challenging its power and its institutions in a mean-
ingful way from an external position will surely now be impossible.
Where, then, might we end up? The UK may have happened upon the worst of both
worlds: in danger of further domestic misunderstanding of a parliamentary sovereignty
which was not undermined by EU membership, while having diminished national
sovereignty in pursuit of a romantic return to a mythical constitutional past. This
does not mean there is no way back (although not to the EU—that path is surely
closed, both in order to respect the domestic democratic decision made at the referen-
dum, but also because the remaining 27 Member States are quickly moving on without
us). For this is not an argument against parliamentary sovereignty as a democratic con-
stitutional fundamental. Indeed, there is now a need for Parliament to justify its consti-
tutional position more than ever, taking an active role in ensuring that the government is
subject to sufﬁcient means and levels of political accountability during the Brexit nego-
tiations, and that an adequate legislative solution is constructed through which EU legal
norms can be replaced, as required, and to the extent necessary. Nevertheless—banal
though it may be for academics to call for clearer thinking about core concepts—we
also need to try to understand the true nature of the problems that underlie national
concerns about sovereignty, rather than distort those concerns by constructing false pro-
blems relating to domestic legislative authority which required no solution.
Brexit has real potential to further exaggerate constitutional problems operating at
both a domestic and a supranational level: the alienation of citizens, the remoteness
of power and the fragility of accountability. There is important legal and political
36 See generally Martin Loughlin, The Idea of Public Law (OUP 2003) 72–98.
37 In the context of environmental law, see, eg, Liz Fisher, ‘Sovereignty, Red Tape… and the Environment’
The EU Referendum and the UK Environment: An Expert Review (16 June 2016) <http://environmenteuref.
blogspot.co.uk/2016/06/sovereignty-red-tapeand-environment.html>.
38 In the context of the WTO, see, eg, Gregory Messenger, ‘Brexit and the World Trade Organization’
(OUPblog, 2 May 2016) <http://blog.oup.com/2016/05/brexit-wto-world-trade-organization/>.
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thinking to be done to try to prevent the worst possibilities, and reﬂection on how to
make the most of sovereignty—both parliamentary and national—will be a vital part
of this work. Whether in the process of exiting the EU and establishing a new future
relationship with Europe, or in the substantive policy choices which may be opened
up in a whole range of areas, from labour rights to the environment, or from agriculture
to competition, Brexit will be an immense challenge for the UK’s distinctively political
constitution.39 Great attention, engagement and a proper understanding of what is at
stake, will all be necessary if what we see in practice is to exhibit some of the virtues
of this approach to government.
IV. CONCLUSION
The UK’s current sovereignty situation may therefore be a rather unsatisfactory one.
Even the new Prime Minister Theresa May now promises that Brexit will restore the
UK’s position as a ‘sovereign country’.40 Yet was the EU ever really the UK’s major
problem with respect to our sovereignty? Grifﬁth’s classic lecture ‘The Political Consti-
tution’ ends by recounting an Auden poem, in which preparations are made for a major
expedition. Yet these preparations turn out to be in vain: ‘In theory they were sound on
Expectation, Had there been situations to be in; Unluckily they were their situation’.41 If
all of this bewilderment ever clears, and once we eventually move beyond Brexit, we may
ultimately come to a similar, unsettling realisation about sovereignty in, and of, the UK:
perhaps we were our situation all along.
39 See Michael Gordon, ‘Brexit: A Challenge for the UK Constitution, of the UK Constitution?’ (2016) 12(3)
European Constitutional Law Review, 1–36.
40 See ‘Theresa May’s Conservative Conference Speech: Key Quotes’ (BBC website, 2 October 2016) <www.
bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-37535527>.
41 WH Auden, Collected Shorter Poems 1927–1957 (Faber and Faber 1966) cited in JAG Grifﬁth, ‘The Political
Constitution’ (1979) 42 Modern Law Review 1, 20.
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